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Most developed countries have started the implementation of biometric electronic identifica-
tion cards, especially passports. The European Union and the United States of America 
struggle to introduce and standardize these electronic documents. Due to the personal nature 
of the biometric elements used for the generation of these cards, privacy issues were raised on 
both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, leading to civilian protests and concerns. The lack of trans-
parency from the public authorities responsible with the implementation of such identification 
systems, and the poor technological approaches chosen by these authorities, are the main 
reasons for the negative popularity of the new identification methods. The following article 
shows an approach that provides all the benefits of modern technological advances in the 
fields of biometrics and cryptography, without sacrificing the privacy of those that will be the 
beneficiaries of the new system. 




The 2003 European Council of Thessalo-
niki confirmed the need in the European Un-
ion for a coherent approach on biometric data 
for documents, both for European Union citi-
zens and third country nationals. The main 
purpose for enhanced and harmonized securi-
ty standards was the protection against falsi-
fication and fraudulent use. The introduction 
of biometric identifiers was found necessary 
in order to establish a reliable link between 
the genuine holder and the document he 
posses [3]. 
The United States is also deploying a similar 
system, through the Department of Home Se-
curity and the State Department. This also 
led to the promulgation by the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) of a 
standard for e-passports [1]. 
An important concern is the protection of in-
dividuals with regard to the personal data to 
be processed in the context of passports and 
other travel documents. No unneeded infor-
mation should be stored in such documents, 
and the information shouldn’t be available to 
more persons than necessary. 
The information to be associated with such 
documents includes a facial image on the sto-
rage medium, and fingerprint information 
stored in electronic format with emphasis on 
the integrity, the authenticity and the confi-
dentiality of the data. 
The biometric features stored in these docu-
ments should only be used for verifying the 
following: 
• the authenticity of the document 
• the identity of the holder 
Several member states have already planned 
the implementation of a central database for 
storing the biometric data of the passport. Al-
though it is possible to implement only a ve-
rification procedure of biometric data using a 
centralized database, this approach presents 
additional risks regarding the protection of 
personal data, such as the development of 
further purposes not foreseen in the regula-
tion [4]. 
The right way to implement such a passport 
would be to use only the decentralized sto-
rage in the chip of the passport, and the rest 
of the article will show how such an ap-
proach can be implemented with the current-
ly available technical solutions. 
 
Public key infrastructure 
The concept of public-key cryptography was 
introduced by Whitfield Diffie and Martin 
Edward Hellman in their 1976 paper "New 
Directions in Cryptography". The public-key 
(or asymmetric) cryptography uses a pair of 
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mathematically related keys to perform the 
encryption and decryption operations. One of 
these paired keys is only known to its owner 
(the private key) while the other is publicly 
known (the public key). The introduction of 
the public key cryptography was a quantum 
leap in the security field because it offers a 
practical solution to multiple problems: data 
and party authentication, privacy without a 
shared secret and key distribution [7]. 
A year later, Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and 
Leonard Adleman at the Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology publicly described the al-
gorithm that had became the de-facto stan-
dard for public key cryptography in the last 
thirty years, RSA (named after the initials of 
their surnames) [9]. 
The two main applications of public key 
cryptography are data confidentiality and da-
ta authentication. 
For data confidentiality, a message encrypted 
using the recipient’s public key can only be 
decrypted by the recipient, using the paired 
private key (see figure 1) [6]. 
 
Fig. 1. Data confidentiality 
 
For data authentication, a message signed 
with the recipient’s private key can be openly 
checked by anyone possessing the public key 
and validated; data tampering is virtually im-
possible without breaking the validation (see 
figure 2) [6]. 
Both applications are of interest for electron-
ic identification documents, as the article will 
show. 
Today, the public key cryptography has be-
come an essential security mechanism for 
any open and popular system. Even for de-
vices with memory, power, and computation-
al resource constraints, for which the conven-
tional algorithms used in the public key cryp-
tography are not well suited, new methods 
and algorithms have been developed, such as 
the Elliptic Curve Cryptography [10].  
 
Fig. 2. Data authentication 
 
Both applications are of interest for electron-
ic identification documents, as the article will 
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Today, the public key cryptography has be-
come an essential security mechanism for 
any open and popular system. Even for de-
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al resource constraints, for which the conven-
tional algorithms used in the public key cryp-
tography are not well suited, new methods 
and algorithms have been developed, such as 
the Elliptic Curve Cryptography [10].  
 
Identity Certificates 
Public key certificates (identity certificates) 
are electronic documents that bind together a 
public key and an identity. Their main pur-
pose is to verify that a public key belongs to 
an individual, identified by the information 
stored in the certificate. That information can 
consist of the name, the address, unique iden-
tification numbers, but can also be extended 
to include additional data, such as the facial 
image required by the electronic passport 
regulations. 
In order to verify the information stored in 
the certificate, a validation mechanism is re-
quired. This validation mechanism is the 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and consists 
in a set of hardware, software, people, poli-
cies and procedures needed to create, man-
age, store, distribute and revoke digital certif-
icates [10]. It binds the identities and public Informatica Economică vol. 13, no. 1/2009  102
keys from certificates by means of a certifi-
cate authority. The binding is usually per-
formed using the same public key cryptogra-
phy methods described above, and digitally 
signing the certificates using the private key 
of the certificate authority. The process of 
obtaining the certificate associated with a 
private key can be seen in figure 3 [6].  
 
Fig. 3. Public Key Infrastructure 
 
The certificate authority that issued a cer-
tificate can also revoke it, if the integrity of 
the certificate has somehow been compro-
mised. This can occur in one of the follow-
ing circumstances: 
• the certificate is no longer required, and 
the subject will no use it anymore: for ex-
ample, the person no longer needs the 
passport 
• the identity corresponding to the certifi-
cate is removed: for example, the person 
dies and this makes the passport no longer 
useful 
• the subject of the certificate has breached 
the trust of the certificate authority that is-
sued the certificate: for example, the iden-
tification data associated with the certifi-
cate was intentionally misrepresented to 
the certificate authority during the process 
of verifying the identity of the subject 
• the certificate was used for illicit purpos-
es: for example, the passport is sold and 
used by other persons, or the international 
policies are not followed by the owner of 
the passport 
• the private key is compromised, due to 
theft or improper storage: for example, the 
passport is stolen from the subject and the 
risk exists of it being used by other people 
to identify as the original owner 
The list above is by no means exhaustive; 
other reasons for certification revocation can be 
added, based on the certificate authority poli-
cies. 
There are alternatives to the public key infra-
structure, such as the web of trust, which in-
volves self-signed certificates and attestations 
by third-parties of those certificates, or simple 
public key infrastructure, which doesn’t use 
any notion of trust, the verifier being also the 
issuer. Neither of these is of interest for elec-
tronic passports, since the primary requirement 
is the authentication of the document by a pub-
lic agency, so the assumed model for the rest of 
the article will be the public key infrastructure.  
The public agencies will act as certificate au-
thorities, providing all certificate related activi-
ties mentioned above, from receiving a certifi-
cate request from the person needing a new 
identification document and issuing the valid 
certificate, to the management of certificate re-
vocation lists according to public policies. 
 
Smart cards 
Smart cards are cards that incorporate within 
their thickness one or more integrated circuits 
(see figure 4). They are also called chip cards 




Fig. 4. Typical smart card 
 
The most commonly used format for smart 
cards is defined in the ISO/IEC 7810:2003 
international standard that defines four 
formats of identification cards: ID-1, ID-2, 
ID-3 and ID-000, especially the ID-1 
(banking cards) and ID-000 (SIM cards) 
[5].  
Additional international standards that re-
fer to smart cards: 
• ISO 7813 that defines additional charac-
teristics of ID-1 identification cards 
• ISO 7811 that defines techniques for re-
cording data on ID-1 identification cards 
• ISO 7816 that defines ID-1 identification 
cards with an embedded chip (smartcard) 
and contact surfaces 
• ISO 14443 defines identification cards 
with an embedded chip and a magnetic 
loop antenna 
The most appropriate smart cards for using 
in the identification process are those that 
include public key cryptography functio-
nalities. Such a smart card can:  
• generate a private-public key pair;  
• store the private key in an inaccessible 
store (the key cannot be retrieved from the 
smart card, it can only be used internally in 
performing cryptographic functions) 
• retrieving the public key for publication 
• sign data using the private key 
• decrypt data encrypted with the public 
key 
• generate certificate requests containing 
the public key 
• store certificate responses from certifica-
tion authorities 
• besides asymmetric cryptographic functional-
ities they can usually perform symmetric en-
cryption and decryption 
• biometric enrolment 
The last function will be further detailed, since 
it represents one of the most important re-
quirements of the electronic passport. 
 
Biometrics 
In most scenarios, a smart card is associated 
with a person. It is very important to be able to 
ensure that the person using the smart card is 
the person that the smart card was initially as-
sociated with. For some applications, when the 
smart card main function is to identify the per-
son, like in access control applications or pass-
port applications, this is the main purpose of 
the smart card itself. In other cases the smart 
card is used to allow the access to data stored 
about that person. In both scenarios, it is man-
datory that the system ensures the pairing be-
tween the person and the smart card. 
One of the advantages of a smart card based 
system is that it doesn't usually need to recog-
nize the person. The common approach is to 
verify the person identity, to determine if the 
person is who he or she claims to be, which is 
much easier and faster than recognition, which 
involves a great deal of computing time and da-
tabase searches [5].  
The most commonly used human characteristic 
used for biometric matching is the fingerprint. 
The rest of the article will refer to fingerprint 
authentication, unless otherwise stated. 
Biometric matching is a complex process, con-
sisting is the following steps [2]: 
a)  Data acquisition (an image scan of the fin-
gerprint, received from a fingerprint scanner) 
b)  Data enhancement (edge detection algo-
rithms, resulting a cleaned up version of the 
scanned image) 
c)  Feature detection (patterns and minutia 
identification in the cleaned image) 
A visual representation of the feature extraction 
process can be seen in figure 5. 
There are three approaches to adding biometric 
information to smart card systems [8]: 
• Template-On-Card (TOC) – the template is 
stored on the smart card, but all the biometric Informatica Economică vol. 13, no. 1/2009  104
procedures are performed outside the 
smartcard, at the reader side; these include 
data acquisition, feature extraction and 
matching; during this process the reader 
requests the identifying template from the 
smart card and matches it with the scanned 
template; this approach can be applied to any 
biometric information, not only fingerprints.  
 
Fig. 5. Feature extraction process 
 
• Match-On-Card (MOC) – the original bio-
metric information is stored on the smart 
card; some of the biometric procedures are 
performed on the reader side, like data acqui-
sition and feature extraction; this way a new 
template is constructed for the scanned in-
formation; the new template is then sent dur-
ing for validation to the smart card, which 
performs a matching check with the internal-
ly stored template; the final decision is com-
puted by the smart card itself; the template 
stored on the smart card is not retrievable, 
just like the private key used; this approach 
can also be applied to any biometric informa-
tion, not only to fingerprints 
• System-On-Card (SOC) – the smart card 
incorporates the original template, but also 
the entire reader, including the biometric sen-
sor and biometric processor; all validation 
procedures are performed on the smart card 
itself: data acquisition, feature extraction, 
template generation and matching); this ap-
proach is applicable only to fingerprint based 
matching, due to the nature of the reader in-
cluded in the smart card; future development 
of smart card based biometric readers can 
add support for additional biometric features 
For biometric passports, the most appropriate 
is the match-on-card technology. 
The template-on-card technology has the dis-
advantage of allowing the personal biometric 
information to be retrieved from the smart 
card. In a closed environment, where all the 
components of the system can be thoroughly 
audited to prevent security leaks, that might 
not raise many issues, but considering the 
fact that passport identification represents a 
cross-border application, with multiple dif-
ferent implementations and tools, and many 
jurisdictions involved, it can raise numerous 
privacy issues each time the smart card is 
used. 
The system-on-card technology might be the 
safest to use regarding the privacy, but is the 
least extendible, since it is intrinsically re-
lated to the fingerprint readers. It is also the 
least developed and market-ready technology 
of the three above. Cost is also prohibitive, 
and the current chip technologies that can be 
embedded in smart cards are either not fast 
enough to process pattern searches on the 
scanned fingerprint, or have high levels of 
power consumption that require complex so-
lutions for embedding batteries into the smart 
card. 
The match-on-card is extendible by adding 
support for other pattern matching than the 
fingerprint based one, and is safer to use, 
since it doesn’t provide the stored biometric 
template to the readers, which is a very sensi-
tive issue especially if the smart card is a 
contactless one, accessible without any phys-
ical contact between the smart card and the 
reader. 
 
Issues and Concerns 
The move to a biometric cross border identi-
fication system raises numerous concerns, 
regarding both the privacy of the citizens us-
ing the new identification system, and the Informatica Economică vol. 13, no. 1/2009 
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implementation of such a system in different 
states. 
Some of these concerns were raised by the 
European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) 
regarding the proposal for a regulation of the 
European Parliament for standards for securi-
ty features and biometrics in passports and 
travel documents. Some of these concerns are 
presented in the following [4]. 
The European Commission failed to consult 
the EDPS regarding the proposal, showing 
little or no concern at all regarding the pro-
tection of individuals’ rights and freedoms 
with regard to the processing of personal da-
ta. The Commission didn’t conduct an impact 
assessment on the proposal, being therefore 
in unable to properly evaluate the necessity 
and proportionality of the proposal in relation 
to data protection issues, limiting the analysis 
to the cost triggered by new measures. 
The use of biometrics provides advantages, 
but these benefits would be dependent on 
stringent safeguards being applied. A list of 
common obligations or requirements which 
need to be respected when biometric data are 
used in a system must be used to avoid that 
the passport holder is to carry the burden of 
system imperfections, such as misidentifica-
tion or failure to enroll. 
There should be exemptions from giving fin-
gerprints based on the age of the person or 
his/her inability to give fingerprints. This is 
the case for children, for which the finger-
prints are not of sufficient quality to allow 
on-to-one verification of identity. This also is 
the case of elderly people, with the accuracy 
and usability of fingerprints decreasing with 
age. Such persons shouldn’t be discriminated 
by the proposed system. 
Also, the one passport – one person concept, 
considering the exemptions above, fails to 
address the case of children below the age at 
which biometric data can be used travelling 
with their parents. 
The identification documents used by the is-
suing agency to identify a person vary from 
state to state, including birth certificate, citi-
zenship certificate, family book, parental au-
thorization, driving license, utility bill. These 
documents are more likely to be subjected to 
forgery and counterfeiting, enjoying less se-
curity features. This can decrease the quality 
of data in passports for the entire system, and 
can lead to risks of identity theft. The biome-
tric passport is only one link in the security 
chain starting with the identification docu-
ments used to obtain that passport, and there-
fore the entire system is just as safe as the 
weakest link, regardless of the enhanced se-
curity involved by the passport. 
Also, as noted at the beginning of the article, 
several States have foreseen the implementa-
tion of a central database for storing the bio-
metric data of the passport, which presents 
additional risks regarding the protection of 
personal data. The use of only decentralized 
storage, in the wireless chip of the passport, 
should be imposed by regulations. 
Before going into effect such a proposal 
should address the issues of Failure to Enroll 
Rate (FER) for the enrollment process and 
False Rejection Rate (FRR) for the matching 
process in a uniform way for all the states. 
 
System Integration 
Identifying a person in a cross border system 
requires the use of well defined standards and 
protocols. The level of trust should very high 
for both the technologies used and the au-
thorities issuing the identification documents. 
As stated above, the process of document is-
suing is basically an implementation of the 
public key infrastructure. Each country has a 
public agency that acts as a certificate author-
ity. The identification document is the certif-
icate that the agency has to authenticate. 
The process starts by the citizen issuing a 
passport request. For this, he has to present 
full documentation to the authorities for na-
tional identification. A new identification 
card is created, which generates a new pub-
lic/private keys pair. The person requesting 
the passport inputs the biometric data upon 
key generation, so that the cryptographic 
functions of the card will only be available 
upon authentication using the biometric ele-
ments (see figure 6). 
The electronic certificate containing all the 
provided information, along with the public 
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public authority, which validates it using the 
private key of the agency. This way any party 
interested can check the information pro-
vided by the user of the passport against the 
public key (usually enclosed in a certificate 
also) of the issuing agency. 
 
Fig. 6. Passport request 
 
In order to check the identity of the passport 
owner, the owner will first present the pass-
port to the border authority. Using the biome-
tric readers, he will then give access to the 
internally stored certificate information 
(identification data and picture). The ob-
tained certificate is validated against the cer-
tification authority (the issuing national 
agency). If the certificate is validated, a final 
sign request is sent to the card in order to ve-
rify that the smart card contains the private 
key paired with the public key from the cer-
tificate. If the response is valid, the process 
ends successfully (see figure 7). 
 
Fig. 7. Validating passport 
 
The performed checks are not related only to 
the mathematical pairing of the keys and sig-
natures. The national authority that issued the 
passport can, and should maintain a revoca-
tion list, against which the passport can be al-
so automatically checked. The passports will 
also have expiration dates specified in the 
embodying certificate, which will be auto-
matically checked by the system. 
The only thing that the system should not do 
is store the biometric information anywhere. 
The only storage operation of biometric in-
formation should be performed during pass-
port generation, and only on the smart card. 
This step should only be allowed once, when 
issuing the certificate. This can be ensured by 
the design of the smart card, and the fact that 
the information from a passport cannot be 
moved on a more permissive smart card, 
since the private key cannot be retrieved. 
This way both the uniqueness of the passport 
information and the match between the smart 
card and its owner are proved with the high 
level of certainty required from the new elec-
tronic passport system. 
Conclusions 
The need for better identification methods is 
a valid and justified one. Technological ad-
vances allow the implementation of informa-
tional systems much more secure than a pa-
per based authentication implementation, re-
gardless of the security elements involved in 
the production of such paper based docu-
ments – one of the most used ways of falsify-
ing paper documents is not generating new 
ones, but reusing existing ones. 
The advances in the information technology, 
especially in the security and biometrics 
fields, allow national agencies to put behind 
all these concerns. But, with the switch to an 
electronic reimplementation of the existing 
system, special care has to be put into not 
raising new issues, most importantly regard-
ing the privacy of those that should benefit 
from the system. 
The solutions exist for avoiding these issues, 
and the society has proven their importance 
by taking action against any plan that ignored 
them. The approach presented in this article 
isn’t the only possible one. It’s intended only Informatica Economică vol. 13, no. 1/2009 
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as a proof of concept that there is a way to 
solve all the current problems that led to the 
need to improve the system, without intro-
ducing new problems. 
In avoiding introducing new problems re-
sides the success of any change, and this one 
makes no exception from the rule. 
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